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Abstract 
This chap1crcxpJores lhc value of form:,.il (mathematical and computer) models i n 
psychology. Rt.-:-;c.:irch on fac1ors that have bt.-cn sht>v.·n t<.l bill.$ ~nd limit un;iidcd hun13n 
rc.asoning is briefly rcvic\ved, and ii is ootcd 1ha1 psychoJooists arc susccplible to these 
errors.just ~·s thi.:ir subjects are. 0 1aracteris1ics of fonnal~models arc discussed in relation 
10 suc:h errors, in an cffol't It) identify the \\'ays in \Vhich models can and cannot aid 
scicn1i£ic thought. So1ne lirni1t11ions of the· modeling approach arc also discussed. 11 is 
argticd that because psychc)fl)giC(•I models grca1ly oversimpli fy the don1ains to '"hich !hey 
arc <ipplicd, model e\•aluatic)n is a Ct:>mplcx ma11er. The n1easurc of a n1odcl's value lies no1 
in its ability to fi1 data, but in ho\v rnuch \ VC can learn from it. 
\Vhen I \Vas a Senior at Northv..·~tern Universi1v, I \vas enrolled in an honors 
seminar. One of our firs I assig_nnlenL-. \vas to give- ~·n ofat report on an article fro1n 
Po:\•cfl()/()gica/ R('11i~1v. For n1y report, l Ch()se. a p11pcr by someone a1 the University or 
\
1ermon1. nanled Benne1 B. r ... turclock. Jr. (~1urdcck, 1960). The paper concerned a 
nlcthod or 4uan1ifying 1hc distinctiveness of stintu Ii that vary along a single di111crL'>ic)n. 
One aspect of the pt1per '''<IS applic.ation f>f the. mclhod to ex plaining 1hc shape of theserial-
position curve of serial learning. I t '"as the first ~1uempt I had seen 10 derive forn1ally, front 
a priori oonsiderutions, an cn1pirical 1hcnc)menon of human n1cn1ory, and 1 was quite 
in1pressed. 
Lest Ben be bltimed for ''·hat 1 s.·1y here <.>r c;1s1ig~ 1ed for de1crn1ining 1hc direction 
of my career, I should add 1hat oty atti1udc tc.>\\•ard 1hc role of J'or n1al n1odels in ps)'chology 
has b<..'Cn shaped n1y numerous other expcrie.nces. A~ a firs1-yc:ir graduate studcn1 at 
Stanford, (began \\'Ol'king.on :i coml;'uter si~tula.ti?n rnodel of p11ired-::1SS(.x:iate le;irning thal 
eve.n1u1'tlly bcc~me lhc topic of my d1sscrta11on (H1n1zntall, I 968). This ''")rk alJo,ved me 
to experience I irs1·hand the l i1nitati<)ns of in1ui1ivc reasoning. ·rin1c after ti1nc, I 111ade 
ch;:ingcs in the prc>gram wi1h 1he cxpectatN.'>n of achieving a )>articular ou1come. only to learn 
that 1he revised system <lid not behave as I had planned. l •1lw rec;tll ,vri1ing a 1erm paper 
for a graduate course, prescn1ing a DC\V theory of visu1I illU$ions. based on the recently· 
discovered receptive fields of visual cortical cells. The cl:lss instruc1or \vas as excited about 
the theory tis l \vas1 until one day he dropped by my office to tell ntc he couldn't 1nake it 
""'Otk algebrt1icall>'· (couldn't either. Fortunately 1hc end of the tern1 '"as past and I 
already hatl my "A"'. 
Thc;.-sc.experienccs and othe.rs have made me skeptical of unaided, intuitive 
judgn1ent" t<Jncerning ho'v specific the<)rctical assun1ptions relate to par1icular cn1pirical 
resuhs. 01her people \vho '"ork \\"ith formal models scent to share this distrust. 
The Oa'v in m)' account of visu("ll illu.sions \Va:; caught before any real dan1age had 
been dt)ne. There arc several staQe$ 'vhcrc such errors can be dc1cc1cd as an idea makes its 
uncertain \vay fr(>m private hunch to generally acce-pted principle: in 1he investigator's O\vn 
elaboration and explication of the hunch, in disCllSSions '"ilh colleagues, in the rcvie\ving 
and cdilorial process, and--i f the.5e fail··in publ ished oon1n1en1ary appearing before lhc idea 
is embr.1 ced by the scientific community as a \vholc. But an asscr1ion can be so intuitive!)' 
cornpclling chat it i,..; accepred v..·i1hou1 close cxan1ina1ion. Jn 1hc..o;e cases, it ntay take a 
form;,ll n1oclcl 10 con,•ince researchers th:11 1he assertion is ' vrong. and even then the belief 
tnay be h;ir~l c.o k il.1. The wides.r~ct1d misconc~ption that serial and parallel proccssc,..; can 
easily be d1st1ngu1shed on cmp1r1cal grounds 1s one ex<lmple (sec To\vnscnd, 1990). 
Another is the idea that if J\\'O variable$ inte.ract, then 1bev must aff<..'Ct the same processing 
s1age (see McClelland. 1979, 1988). · 
1-\ nu1nher c)f e.,'\perin1cn1s have been done. in v..·hich subjects fi rSt le~1rn to clas..<:ify 
ca1cgory cxen1plars, and then :ire tested on thcexe.n1plars and aJso on category prototy1)CS 
\\'hich 1hey have flt)t seen before. Classification perfor111ance can be higher for the 11ev..· 
pro1otypcs tha11 for the c.1ld exemplars. Even \\·here this difference is not present initially, it 
has been reported to emerge over 1in1c. The standard inlerprc.tation--v..·hich I once 
11cccptcd·-has been that a representation of thcccn1ral tendency of the category is aOOtracted 
•ind ~lored, and that this represen1:11ion has a slo,ver forgeuing rate than do traces of the 
exemplars themselves. \\.'e nQ\v knO\\' that a sin1ple ntodel thal stores only exen1plars can 
(l<..x:ount for such re.o;ulL'> (Hin1zman1 1986: Hin1zn1an .. ~. Ludlan1, I 980). 
~fany experiments have been rept)rted in v..•hich subjc..-cts sc:·1reh for e1emc111s such :.'IS 
Je11ers- -..:i1hcr in a set conlnlilled to memory or in a visual d1splay. Such cxpcrin1cn1s 
produce a varic1y of rcsuJL~ ~rd'J 1i.mc:s may jncmt:SC ljncarty with set si£c. ur increase 
nonlinear1y. or nOI increase al all: ond search 1imcs on trials vi.•bcn 1hc tar~I is abscnl may 
shf>\\• the 5:1Lmc slope or a grc.a1er slope th3n on posili'rc: trials. 1bc standanl ,.~. in 
c:og.ni1i .. -c psychology hai; bcaJ lha.t th~ different patterns require for their cxp1anation 
di11'crcnl sorts of mechanisms--incorporating c i1her a si:rial or n parnUcl search, fc)r 
cxn1nplc, and either~ scJf.1crmin:11ins or an ~xhaus1iveSl()p rule. HowC\'Cf, fo11nal 
model~ show tha1 basically the s.an1c n1cchan1sn1s can produce any of 1hcsc results 
(Broadhont, 1987: Townsend, 1990). 
Studcn1s <.lf mcn1ory arc currc.:ntly ln1crcs100 in relationships and oon1par i~ln.'i 
:unt)n,e: memory tasks. A popular idea h11.s been I hat cc.rtain patll.:ms of rcsuJ1s indicate that 
two tusks arc pcrfc)rmed b)' dilT~rcnt memory systcn1s. One $uch paucrn is a func1ional 
dissociation, in which a ma.nipulilh.:d .. ·nrlitblc has difft:rcnt effects on the two llL'ks. The 
01hcr is s1oc.Ms.1ic indcpcnOOncc<lbplaycd by the con1ingmcy 1abk. rcl:w.ina suCCl.'SSC5 and 
(allures on the tasks. formal models. fK>we,·er, sho\\• that such data paucrns ore not 
diagnostic or diffcrmt S)"Stem.~. A sin.de memory systan c::an fll:cdicl functional 
d;.socla1ioo.< (Anderson & Rede<, 1987: Humphr~y•, Bain, & Pike. 1989). ond two tast.s 
can show s1ochmaic independence cvc:.n If the s:an.e S)1'-tcm pcrfomu both 1asI~s (J l intxman. 
1987: Nosor.~ky, 1988). (for furlher discussion of lhC$e issues. soc Hin11mon. 1990.) 
Another example Cron1 the field or memory concerns ho'v Jncmt)ry fur ~·n original 
event is inOuenccd by the inte'l?oln1ion or Ct)nllic1ing inforn1a1ion l>ct\vccn the1)riginal 
learning anti the 1cs1. 111 a t y111c:1I cxpcrhncn1, suhjcc1~ must choos.c bcl\vccn 1hc original 
;ind the i111er11ub1tcd infonnation «>n n forccc.1-choicc re(."X)gniti<.>n tc'Jt T hese subjects appear 
10 displily poorer rc<.."Cgnition tllc1nory 1h;111 do con1roL-; " 'h1) did not sec 1hc Interpolated 
m~11cr'k1L ' f he rc.')ult h:i.s bcc.n \Vidcly intcrprctl'CI as sho,ving that 1hc inconsisccnt 
informa1fon either is incorporated di.:stnictivcly inco theorigin::iJ memo I)' 1racc or interferes 
\Vith ics retrieval. HOY.'f.-,·cr. ~tcCk>sky and Zaragoza (1985) sho"·al. using nun1erical 
examples.. that the resuh i:scnlircly consislcnt " ·ith :ot simpk:: ~1arkov model that ILUumes 
coex-istcnc:c and noointer-fen.-ncc bc:l\\'CCR trlttS or the ongin:al and intcrpolalcd cvcru.s. 
I can'1 n;:sis:l adding a soancwha1 di((crcnl example.. A recent lcxlbook on learning 
h:is a chap1er on sociobiology, " ·hich con1ains the follO\\•ing claim rcgan.linJ: ~.-ual 
pron1iscui1y: "\\1hilc adultery l'At~ for n1cn and "·ome111nay be oqualiiing.. men slill have 
n1orc par1ncn;; lhan '''omen do, i1ntl they :ire n1orc likely to haveone.niBhl ~"1nds" (Lctihcy 
& liorrls, 1985. p. 287). It is c1car from the contcxl that lhis docs noL hinsc on the slight 
plurnlil y of \VOmen to n1c.n ('vhich '''ould mo kc ii trivial), and th al hornosexunl JJarlners do 
1101 co uni. J challenge. anyoni; 10 S<.::t up " rormal 111<ldel consis1cnt v.· i1h lhc c lnin1 ··tha1 is. 
1hcr1.: n1us1 be equal nurnbcr:s of n1cn and \VOrncl\, hut men mu.s1 h;ivc n1ori.: hcccroscxual 
11:irtncrs than \VOntcn do. (\Vhilc you arc Bl iL, derive the. prediction abou1 oni;·nighl 
$land.~) An crfort to set up such a model could have helped the authors ;ivoid making a 
1na1hcm:11ically impossible c:J;iim. 
~'fy general point is that funnal models are of prm-en ''aluc in ps)-Cholot:Y· They 
can dear up misconcqxions and n.-vcal undcrfyi.ng truths th.at are not obvKtUS: 1t first 
glincc. The 1ypical member of this audk!ncc may see the ,ia.Jue or 1nodclin~ as beyond 
dispute; hut this audience is not a rcpr .... -scn1a1ivc sample, and many JlS)"Choloiil\t~ are quite 
skeptical about the mode.ling approach. I propose chat " 'e try to untlerstand "'hy··Jtnd in 
wl1at ways--formal 1nodcJs ad"ancc our undcrslanding. This m<•y help us increase 1hc 
efficiency of our science hy pulling models 10 l>eller use. f\.fy hor.>e in I his chapter is lo a1 
lctl'll provoke son1c 11eedcd thoughl ond discussion on thi.s importunl bul ncglcc1cd topic. 
Sclmc preliminary conuncnt.<1 :ire fn order. fitst. I discuss 011ly i.::<ploniuor-y 1nudcls· 
·lhe 1hoorelical side of the research \l.ntcrpril\c. Form;:il models of data 3t\l. used ulntost 
u.nM:rsally in pq-cbo&ogy. ft>r ex.ample in our s1andard statistical lt.-chniqucs. It might aiso 
be """Onhwhile k> ask. why moili:b of d31a ue useful (and nuxe widely accc;pKXI 1han the 
cxplanatOf)' kind) hut I \\.'OD'I do tha1 here. Second, in many pcoptc's minds, formal 
motleling is synonymous with quantitative modeling. HOY.'CVcr. SOr rcasom: 1ha1 will 
bceomi; apparent later, I wan110 inakc n dls1inc1ion here. Quantit:Ui\'C n,odc-ls. whic-h 
•11cmp110 aC("<·,un1 for the prcci!:'C nu1ncrical values obtained in an empirical invcs1iga1ion, 
represent an i1npor1an1 subset of forn1al nlc)dels, bul 1hc gcncra1 class is much broader than 
1h111. Third, 1h.; qu.cs.tion arises as to _l ~st 'vhat l~c class of for1nal models includes. L.i~e 
m:iny oonccp1s, 1h1s IS a fuzzy one. 01ngrt11n~. llO\\'·Charts: etc. n1ay or muy not quahly as 
formnl n1odcls, depending on 1hc extent to \vhich I hey involvc.syn1bol:1 tha1 nrc nlanipulatcd 
according IC) tlcfinite rul~. Dy ~1ric1 in£; the discussion to the clear Cll$~~ or n1a1hcn1a1ic-al 
und C:OlllputCr models, \\'C Can avoid 3tSUll1S !lht)ut CX'1Cll)' \vhere the fu:t.t.)' boundaries lie. 
1'he rollo,ving discussion h'1s four parL\. Firs-t. I list several sources o( error in 
unaided human l"t.".il$0Ding: sccanrJ, I discuss ahe nature of formal modcbi third. I auemp110 
relate models M> rcasoninl! e«ors. to unCO\'Cr where the advantages of mndclin1' mig.h1 lie. 
fiMlly, I oonside:r the cv3tuation of formal model~ and argue thal there arc limttalions as 
well M ad\•arttag.....-.. in their use. 
Human J~casoning 
A growing body of psycl1ologic;il rcscilrch auest<: 10 the n,.,,.s and (olblcs of hun'lan 
thouuht. Son1e phenomena that scxrn dir« lly relevant to e.rrors in s1.:icntlflc rc<isoning arc 
:L'i ft)llo"'·s: 
I. \Vorking 1nemory capacity constrnins the nun1ber of CQnCcJ)IS or entities \\IC can 
1nnnipul:uc mentally al the same tin1e (e.~ .. Johnson-Laird, 1983). Chunkinl:. 
aulOmatization or rufes, and cx1cr1Uil aids such as diagrams can relieve the burden 
somewhat (KocO\~ky. Hayes, & Simoo. 1985). but the limitations ore >till SC•'Crc. 
Bruner. Goodnow. and Austin (1962) referred 10 this pn>blem e>-oc:<ttivcly os "ccgniti•'e 
strain: 
2. lmag.ining a dvnamic i)•Stcm in ~ct ion mav require kecpi11g lr.aek o(thc current 
StJllCS or sc..-vcr3J variable~<:. Humnns have difficulty Updating the current volucs or vari~hlt$ 
and llurging from n1cmory ou1d~1cd ones (Bjork, 1978). 
3. Because mcn1ory i.~ co111cnt·:iddrcssilble, sin1ilarity is of overriding imeortancc 
in rc1ricvr1I. Humans reason by an~1lo~· \Vilh fan1iliar si 1ua1ion~ (Ni~bcll , Fong, Lehman, 
& Cheng. 1987). \\X:: tend to judgi.; likelihood based on ease of ttlricval (Tvcrsky & 
K:ihncman, 1973). \\'c arc prone 10 confuse sin1ilar concepts and (>ert.>cpt:s, :ind even 
~lmllar-sounding \1.:ords. 
4. J.luman cognitioo is fauh·totcranl. in that it ¥till come IQ l(Uick·and·di'ny 
conclusiorn- even when crucial infonn31k>n is missing. People arc generally no1 aware o( 
1hcex1ent Ill which dcfauJl ocpc:c&111ions 3nd objccliv-e da1a ~-c b.."Cn inkfmixcd in the 
C0C1clusion< •hey have reached (c.R·· Johnsoo. Bransfool & Solomoo. 1973). 
S. 1be rnapping or n1caning.s 10 "''t>rds ~nd o(,,·ords to meanings is 1101 nne·t~· 
one. One oonscqucncc is that a \'Crllal 11r~umcnt can n1aintain a11parcnt coherence " 'h1le 
sublly relying, :11 di(fcrcnt points, on different (and possibly conllicting) in1erprc1a1ions of 
the snmc or synonymous \\'Ords. Another consequence is that pcoi>le 11111y reason 
di f(crcn1ly f1hou1 essentially lhc some gitu:11ion if i1 is described in s lightly diff crcnl ' vays 
("(rnniing c ffcCL't"; Tvcrsky & Kahncn1an, 1981 ). 
6. 1 lumans arc biased to accept as: true st:iltmc.::nt.s I hat they h:.l\'C. cncountcrt:d 
frcqucn1ly bc(ore, indcpt.11dcntl~· of whether lht!sta1cmc;n1s arc actually 1rueor false 
(H""1c:r. Coldslcin, & Toppioo. 1977). (Consider 1hc >OCiobloloSY cxamp1c .. •males 
ha•'C more onc-nij:h1 "'•nds. i 
7. l'cq>lc we bater a1 reasoning about nc:u1ral matc:rial than about ma1crial rhat is 
cmolion•lly ch~r:i.""' (l..cfford, 19'46). l'k 1~d 10 ha.-.: ~piancc .or rclc7'ion of!" 
argumcn1's vahd11y on 'vhctbcr or not v.-c hke 1hc conclus.1on (JaniS & f:rick., 194.l; l..ord., 
Ross., & Lepper, l 979). It seems that n:scarchcrs like the conclusion, "I \\'Jl.S right•, and 
dislike the conclusion. •1 was '''rong." In one rcccn.1 CXJ>crint~nt., resenrch scieniists v.rcrc 
ask(...'(I 10 rcvk\v ror publication an experimental paper on ESP. B)! inSCI ling descriptions or 
rcsulls tlull cithcr ai:.rccd or di.~agreed wi1h the ~c1cnt is1s' prcconocp1ions. the cxpcri1nente.r 
manipu1nt<.x.1 chcir C\'.t1lu111inn of lhc cxpcrinlco1al 1ncth1xl (K(x::hlcr, 1989) • 
• S. 0 1.1cc pc."<Jplc kno\''. so'!!ething, _they find .it diffic,~lt or inlpossiblc I~ rc!ll~n,be.r 
'''hat ll \YILS hkc n1>t to kno'v u (F1sc-hhof1, 1975; Fischhol I & Bey th. 1975). lll1s 1s called 
hindsight bias, or the "knc,v0 i1-all-along" effect, hut a~ appli<.xl t<> rcsc.archcrs ic migh1 be 
called the "1h1u's-just·\\•hitt-(·,vould-bavc-ptcdic1ed" e ffect. This 11.:ndcnC)' c~1n pro1cct 
researchers against recognizing \V3)'S in \\•hich their thcori~ arc n:1"'·c...'tl. 
9. tlu1nnns ,,fli.:n trc•ll mere labels or slogan:o;: as though chcy \vcrc cxplana1ions. 
lronk:ally. lhl\ i.\ S() even \\'hen the Label itself implies 1h.it 1hc phenomenon is unexplained· 
-e.g .. UFO and ESP. Exnmpl\:$ from psycholo~v include "diNCI pcr<-ep1ion" {which 
~timc:::s seems S)'Mnymous " 'ith ESP). and~.:schema'"' (of1i.:n credi100 "'1th complex 
powa"S lhac are dr....~rihi:d, but 001 explained). 
10. In hrpt•~is using. humans ba''e a confirma1too hiu. in tha11hcy seek 
informa1ion constS.Cen1 wi1h their fa,tored h)•pothesis. They tend Ml to look for data 1ha1 
would disconfirm the hypothesis, or lo ask '"hethet an allcmative hyp)lht.s~ might also he 
cons.ls1cnt with the d11 1~ (~f)·natt. Dobert''. & T\\•enc.y, 1977: \\'~>n &. Jt\hnst1n·Laird, 
1972). ·11,c. fri ilurc 10 consider other hyp'othe.~~ e'<en Lhouyh the>• rire crucial, has been 
called '1pscudodiritn<~t icity" (Bcyth·~1aront & FischholT. I 983: Oohcr1y, rvtynau, T""cney, 
& Schiavo, 1979). 
S urely lhL" is <)nly a par1ial list, but for present purposes it is 1norc than c11ough. 
Human rc1~soning is Open to many sourocs o( error. 1 \\'ant to cn11,hnsiic just one poinl, 
" 'hich \Viii figure in lhc 11rgumen1s I \\'ill make: J<no,ving the "corrcc1" tlllS\VC,s, 
psychologis1s son1c1i1ncs. chuckle :it 1hc errors that subjects in reasoning cxpcr imcn1s make. 
But \\'C arc as hu1nan 11.S our subjects. and \\'C \vould be foolish indeed to think I hat these 
cogniti"c li1ni1n1ions don'I also apply lo us. 
\Vhy Fot1llal ~1odels'? 
\Vhy s™·>uld psychologists use fotn);3.J models? One misht think 1~1 so 
CundanlCntal a questnxi \\'OUfd be posed and answered as a routine m~utcr in 1he 
introductory SCC1ion of cvc:ry demc::nl3f}' ltcatisc on mathematical ~yehology. I have 
M:'Jn;hcd ~rldcly ror such an acoount, with litllc soc:c:css. Bjork {1913) uri:ucd that mndcb 
makingqu1n1i1ativc predictions are more ezily falsifu.-d; but thal may be a mixOO bles.~ing. 
ror reasons 1ha1 I discuss la1cr. Townsend and Kadlec (1989) .. y 1ha1 psychok•gy nccl• 
mathematics bca.usc ils phenomena are so complex; but du not Sll.)' ~·hy oompkxity should 
m:.ucr. Orn: might argue that te-xthooks do not explain the u!!oC.:fulncss of formal models 
bce11.u.;;;"'. ii is ohvlous; but te:-;1books say many uh\' i<>u~ thinjp'. a.nd it is hard 1<1 i;cc why 
so1nc1h1ng sn cc:nlr3I " 'ould be left out. J ba,•c heard psycholos1~t$ deny 1ha1 1here are any 
a.,"OOd reason for formal models in psychology and cklim 1ha1 modckts arc ju.s1 sbvi.Ulty 
(and inappropriately) imitating phys:IC.':S. so 1hc answer must DOI be obvious. Lad:.ing a 
dear answer regarding psychology per sc, lc1 us s1cp up a IC°"-el in our conccplu31 hierardty 
3nd ask 'A'hy formal n1odelo; V.'Ofk in w hninch or scjcnce. 
There is a Jong hislory of thOu1'ht abou1 \Vh)' mathema1lcs is useful in science as a 
\\•hol~. The 1opic i.~ surveyed rather thoroughly br Kli11e (1985). The P)1thngore-an~ 
rcsol,•cd the mystery by h<ilding chnt 11un1hcr rch111onships are thcNubstnncc 11nd for1n or 
niuurc--lhus. m11thcmatic.~ and nature are <..'Sscntially the s.an1c thing. Plato held thnl reality 
h:id been tl'~ignc..-d accortling 10 n1::11hc1nn1icnl principles, so that onl)' mn1hcm:11ics, and not 
our hupcrfccc senses, can 1cll us '"hat 1u-.iurc is really like . Jn the 1'.1iddlc 1\gcs, people 
didn't think :1bout the problem, bccousc 1111 uccurrcnccs in nature v.•crc consTdcrcd acts of 
GOO: but Renais..;.;1ncc 1hinkers held ch.at "God i.,. n m:uhcma1ician." thus justiryin.i:: 
mn1hcma1~ and s:c:icncc as q~IS 10 gk>rlfy God. Thc..'St: accounts s1ritc me as ~·~fully 
inadc.11ua1c. IA."ep dc.J¥.•n. they juM. say 1hcrc is a correspondence; btt~i:cn mathematics and 
natun.: bc."Causc. a com:spondcncc exists. \Vhat appears I() bt,:. a ('.Um,:nt ~rsk>n of this Iheme 
~ somcthing called the cornpuaational viewpoint of physical proccsscs.. "1bc ~icnc)tion 
here is that the material world and the: d)'namic system$ in ii arc computers land) the l1tY.'S 
or ni.1urc arc algorithms that con1roJ 1hc dcvclop1nent of the system in time, just like real 
programs do for computers." (Pagels. 1988, p. 45). Claiming lhal the n1atcria1 world is a 
computer seems as circular an cxplanu1ion a~ ~r1ying 1ha1 nature is nu1nher <.>r Goll is a 
mo1hc1natic'ian. 
1\no1hcr approach has ht.-cn 10 view rnathc111a1ics :is ;• human invent ion. ra1hcr 1ht1n 
.something having independent cxistenc.-c. 1\ristotle, in contrast to Pl;_1to. s:iw rno1hcn1a1ic.~ 
1&:\ merely descriptive. Bui this leave.Ii un~1ns,vcrcd the key qu~ti,)n of why mo1hcmatics 
~·or ks. kont asserted that lhc mind i1npo~s: s1n1cture on naturc--hencc thi.: si1me cn•ity that 
cren~ ma1hcn1a1ics cn.-atcs o:ur pcrccptic1n or nature. 1"his position seems tt>cndov.· the 
mind with unc.tnny coht.'11.:nc:c (and perhaps :an OVCf\\lhclming confir111.atinn bias). At lxsl. 
ii (ails 10 explain why lheorics so oncn :arc ~·ron~ The dominant modern vM:v.• ~ms lo be 
oom.i:n1ionatism. The idt:a here~ that malhcmaucians invent the maihcmacK:al modl.:ls~~r 
which 1hcr~ arc i~ principle~ inCinile numbcr--and scjcntistS;just 1>ic_k 1hc mod~ts tOOI 
"·nrk best in pantcular domains. Thu,, the correspondence IS ~plained by a lr:1nd of 
O"rwinian selection. If a model fits 1hc da1:1 \ \ 'C keep it. if not \\re either 1nDdify it or 1hrow 
it out <1nd II)' another. The problctn wilh I his aoc:oun1 is 1ha1 .so1nc 1nathi.:1111ttic1tl models 
keep \\'OJking--not just on obscr"ations simil;1r to the ones 1hey \VCtc M!li.:cti.:d 10 explain, 
hut also on co1np1c.tcly no"cl ob5cr\ft1tinns1 v:hich confirn1 long chains of deductions that 
wi.:rc nc"cr tested bef<lrc. This is cruc in the 11hysic:1l seicnc<..'S. i f not in psychology, and it 
is so1ne1hing: thal conventionalism seems u1ahlc 10 explain. On occasion. the power or 
1nnthem;-1ties has been dock1r<.."<I incxplicablc--ft'lr ex~•mplc. by Picra!. Shr6dingcr, and 
Ein..~lcin (Kline, I9S5). ft.·laybc 1his is why m111hcmatlcal psychology tc.«tbooks dan't 
explain ~·h)' mathematic..~ "'Ofks. 
11 may be useful tocharnc:1crizc briefly what mathcma1ics h. ILS essence lies in the 
cono.:p1 o( proof. A mathc.:matical proof begins ~·ith a set of assun1ptions or axioms 
rcpn..-..en1ed by strings tlf discrete syn1bols.. and:-. sci of 1ransfom1a1ioc1 rules that c.an he 
applied to 1he symbol strings. There is: aM a 1boorcm or conclusion 10 be J'>l'Ovcd, als<l 
c:cprcs..;;cd as" symbol string. The proor consists t)f a stcp-by·slcp dcn1ons1r1uion that one 
can get from lhc axioms to lhc theorem by <1pplying the rules. The :;Jxioms or 11 proof must 
be cfcatly statc<.1 and mutually con.si:stcnt. According to Davi!:' :;Jnd Hc~h ( 1981 ). "The 
dcmnndio of precision require thi1t thc meaning of c.1ch symbol or c>ich symbol str ing be 
rtlZ()r ~hnrp and unan1big:u,)us. The symbol .. . is [>crccived in a \VOY \vhich distinguishe.~ it 
fron1 all 01hcr symbols ••• , anJ the mcnning or the symhol is 10 be ;igrccd upon, 
universally• (p. l 24). Moreo"er, in :1 colculalion (e.g., a prool) "a :string o( mnlhcmati~l 
S)'mbots: ,is~ acconli~ IO 3 SUlndardiz.cd SCl of asrcc~n.LS and con~rltd _inlO 
another s1:r1ng of symbols. Thas may be done h)• a machine: 1f 11 ~ dooc by hand, 11 should 
In principle be verifiable b)• a machfnc• (p. 125). Although an ac;tual published proof v.•ill 
cont;i!n many gaps (where 1hc in1ervcnings1cps are presumably obvious). the implicit 
promise ii; 1hat they ~n be fi lled in on dc.:m:'lnd. {These intuitive lc.1ps rirc where c.rrorS are 
moo• oflcn found.) The nalurc of a proof ""d ilS c:cmral role led Suppcs (1984) 10 
charactcri:t:c 1na1hc.m:t1ics ris a "radicnlly cmpiricnl" science, because 1hc evidence (lhe prool) 
is "11x:scnlcd with a completeness not chnrnctcrislic of any othc.r area of science" (p. 78). 
In !<ihort, ma1hcma1ics ha~ lhc carmn1·k.i; of a sy$tcm for imposing consistency on 
rcn.i;oning. Indeed, De.scartc:; sa'v in E.uclid's ~(..'Omclry a ,..,ay to perfect hu11111n reasoning: 
An nrgumcnt \Yas 10 be broken do\vn 11ltO steps so small that none or thcrn c:ould bt' 
doubted. Contrary co K.:1nt, Sup~ (1984) sn.ys.. ! he ccnainty \IJ'C lind in mathematics 
arises not rrom an)' intuitive or a prk>ri consideration but simply from the discrctene.'1..-. and 
easily exhibited character or ahc evidence offered in support of a par1k:ular (empirical) 
cbtm• (p. 79). In a coni.puter ~imula1ion. 1hc steps are •hose of the algorithm being 
cump.ncd, which can be examined in a print-out of the program. \\\:can be: vinually 
cxnain 1hat the program is being rollowOO consistcntl)' because. ii is bcin~ run on a (reliable) 
ma<:hinc. 
lf the essence of ma1hcn1a1ics is consistency, as 1 clai1n, how docs 1ha1 help explain 
why n1a1hc1na1ics Y.'Orks? Al mot, the ans\vcr may bcsin11>ly that rcali1y isconsis1cn1. too. 
This is, of course. :i fundan1cntal nssun1ption of science. At the deepest lcvcl, n11tu1c's 
c:c)nsistcncy prcsu1nably de.rives frorn tlu::r~ hcin.g only a fc \v 1ypcs or c lc1ncn1nry particles 
and forces behind all phenomena in 1hc uni \+erse. In higher or more contplcx domai1ls like 
llS)'Cholog~" oonsislt:11cy derives from similarities 'vithin the ela.sses or objcc1s studicd--
:c.uch. ;1s hum3n brajns. This vlcw scc1ns 10 n1akc.: thi.: po\l,·cr of mathcm::11ic:s explicable 
while rc1aining the basic assun1ptic:lns or c..."Onvcnlionalism. Consistency in1plics an 
unckrlying redundancy in causal n1echani.sms. t..1.'CO \\.'hen surface nianif~1a1ions app!'.ar 
quite dislinc1. ThU$ a ma1hcma1k:al model 1ha1 we have sclccK..'d and rccaincd bcause ia 
mimics.a range of phenomena ina pa.t1K:ularclom3in has a ~chanocofsucccedingon 
Rt.."\\' phenomena in tha1 domain. Allhouifi the surface manifestations may appear~" the 
underlying sources of redundancy have not changed. A one-to-one m;ipping between 
ex>nstrueL~ of the model and entil i c.~ in 1hc \\•oriel should 001 be required lor this to '''ark. 
nhhough prc.~um:tbly it \vould help. 
'l\'ying this ::trguntcnt out on collct1yucs, (have bc.."Cn :1ceuscd of con1r~1d icting 
1nysclf. l said thal humi111.i:; urc inconsi.s1cn1 ill their reasoning. •ind that na1urc is consis1cn1. 
but t1 lso 1hot hun1ans are part or nature. HO\V can hun1ans be i 11co1~sistcnl, then'! I think 
this objection displa)'S the problem or muhiplc meanings, " ·hich I listc.."<1 l!l1rlicr tl..'i reasoning 
problem NS. Humans are 0011s is11.;nt1 in that human reasoning --Jikc all naturol phenomena· 
·Sh()V.'S regularities. ·rhe.~ rcgul.irilk;s might be captured in a f<)rmaJ modcl 0£ hum;an 
f\!3SOning: bul asucces.~ful rnodii.:l probably would 001 assume th.al humans~ 
Dgically··lhat is.. in such a "'ay a$ U> avoid con1radic1~ in the con1cn1~ of their beliefs.. 
111c Ob.)CCtioft, I lhink, a.>nfU$CS tWO rT\CD.Rings or •consisfc.:nt• ""'1C appl)1inJi: lQ the laws 
thal govern 1hinking. and ooc to \Yhal the thooghtS are about 
Formal ~fodcls nnd Sources (>f &1t1r 
Let us now consider how 1hc chornc1cristics of fonnal model~ tclntc 10 the prohJcms 
with huntan reasoning th:1t y,,•crc listed cnrlicr. 
I. \Vorkins memory ptohlcms nrc l;irgcly alleviated by c.xccuting steps c)ne al a 
1in1e. In mnthemaucal n1odcling, inh::rmt..-<liacc results can be roootdcd on nutcpail.'i and 
cuns~tk:d when ni1'daxl; in compu~ simula1ion. 1hcy arc bckl in memory as long; as 
rcqum:d. 
2. Updating is Jik<.."\\.'isc not a problem. pani<...-ularJy if a computer is used. The 
<tbility 10 keep track of 1hc currcnl value=; c>f l:trgc nuntbers of variable$ 1ho1 orc c-0ntinu.11Jy 
chnn~in~ makes co~pu1ers usef u~ in sin1ula,1i.ons of all kinds of complex sys1CJns--c..g., 
wca11lcr paucrns, nat1(111:il econon11es1 nnd n11ht~1ry encounters. 
:l. Symbols arc dist:rctc, so even conccptuttlly similar cntilics should ll<)t L)C 
confused. Oiffe.rcnt versions of a concept arc dis 1in~uishcd by subscrip1s nr su1>erscrip1s. 
in" n1;11hcn1atical 1n<)dcl, t1nd by storins ch~ in(ormatton in different 1nen1ory locntion.o;, in a 
COlllJ)Ulcr. 
4. Oefauh expectations may play a sii:nificant role in inventing a n111hcmn1ical 
pc~( or in devising a P£OS1?D1 to aocomplN. some goal But _t~ mathematical method_ is 
dc:siJ:.ncd 1ocateh any SIL~ 1n the proof 1u.clf 1ha:t an: 001 cxplta.11)' supported by 1hc axioms 
and lhc rules. ln a simulation model. if crucial inrormatk>n is missing or garbled. the 
pros.ram ~ui:tlly will not run. 
5. ·111e requirement lhal symbols h1; clc'1rly dcCinod and scpar31cly identified within 
~· rormal system helps 10 climina1c con1mdic1ions. The consequences of a con1rndictio11 
(e.g .. proolS of l~o 1h P ;ind not. J>) cru1 he unombig\lo\lsly identified in a 111athen1at i~al . 
argun1c1~1. and circular references ~re llny"cd as errors 111 aoon,1p~tcr 1>rogr~n1. ~1kev.· 1se, 
lhc rcqu~rcn1c.n1 lhttt a problcn1 be Jormalfy sh\lc<.I can help to chm1natc fr:1n11ng c l lecLoi;. 
(The question of which is the "correct" formul:11ion is empirical. hO\\'cvcr. os the 
conventionalist vicv.• of ma1hen1a1ics ~ul:l,oest.s.) 
6-7. F::lmiliarit)'. emotionality, ;1n<I n~ccmcn1 or dis<lgreen:icn1wilh1he conclusions 
shoutd play lll:l role in a formal dcduc1ion. per sc. They can. however. powerfully 
influence one's slarting assump1.ion5: ind " 'h.,t one 1rics k> pl'O'lc. (fhc M3lhcmatician. 
Kun Glide~ ;. saKI w ""'" d<!Yiscd a proof or the cxi!acncc of God (P.1."'ts. 1988).) 
Such f3e1ors can alSQ inOucncc 'vhcthcr one lnnk.s (Of a bog in \I program or :11n error in a 
m :ii hem at ica I a rgu menl. These a.re good rca.~ns for re$C::~n:;:her.; 10 'vri tc 1 heir own versions 
of program.o; .ind to check each olhcr's l'roof~. 
8. \\'ith a formal ntodel, hindsigh1 c~)n be rigorously checked. Thal is. ir 1hc theof)' 
wos explici1ly s1~11cd to begin ,.,.ith, then "p<~td iccions" :lnd predictions should be derivable 
f'ron1 1he f1xi<)ms in cx::lclly the santc why. ..\ 11 thcnrcms arc implicil in the :udon\S, 
regardless of \vhethcr they or chc rclcvanc d111a \VCrc rc-alizc<l first. 
9. The requirement 1hat one derive observations from dccp·et a.~umpti(')n~ 
immcdlil.tCI)' exp<)SCS fabcl:s and slo$am ns devoid of cxplan.at(xy poy.·cc. N)rm:il model~ 
would be an invalua~c aid co lbink•ng for thi.t; reason alone. 
I 0. Where ronfirma1ion bias is concerned. the value or formal mode~ ~ not so 
cbr. On 1hc pOSiti ... -e side. a formal n1odc.I can force one to rt.."C<lgniT.c that onc'10 
assumptions are incons.is1cn1 \vith an Cfl1J>irical ootoome. f\,fOrcQ\'cr, cxpcrit.:ncc v.·i1h 
models 1nay he.Jpt>nc. rcaJizc that the oonncc1ion 1>et\veen theoretical 3l'Su1n111ic)ns and 
bchnvlor arc sometime." n1>nobvious, so tho I <11tcrna1ive explant11ions should be considered. 
Sin1uh11ion n1odcls, in particular. c{ln hcle one to develop new intuitions obout the behavior 
of sysh.:ms having propcrt ics such :1:> v;1r1obility, parallclisnl: and nonlinearity. ' f hcsc arc 
ci.:r111inly properties of 1hc brain, :.1n1l 1hcy arc inhercncly hard to undcrs1011d. Models have 
heuristic value, in that cxpcric.ncc with scvcn•I model sys1cms ~1n help one anticipalc hO'-"' 
new conihina1ioas of assumpcions arc fik1.: ly to internet. 
But in other re.o;pects models can magnify 1he oonfirmation hill$. ~fodel building 
can lake an c.nonnous :tmount of in1cllcctual v.·ork, and so modelers have a greater slake 
than 01hcr 1hcotis1s in t1v(Jiding disconfirn1ation. The fc-:1r of rejecting one's model 
manifesls ilSelf as "conscrva1ive focusing" (c.f. Bruner, ct iii.. 1962). Technically 
speaking, the n1odel is being cxpost:d to possible falsification, bul ra1hcr than tC.'>ling 
prcdie1ions that seem unlikely on a priori gr<,unll!i, !he modeler chooses to only slightly 
modify the expcrimcn1al condition.o; under \vhich 1hc n1odel has already shO\\•n success. 
However \veJJ such a s1rategy 1nt1y scr.•c 10 further one's career, it secn1s inirnical to 
scientific prog;css. If the purpl)SC o( research is to discard ntis1aken idca.o; and te.placc them 
'''ith beuer ones, then 1hc sooner we. rC<.:<.lgnizc our errors, the bctte.r scie.nc.e '''e v.•ill do. f f 
theorists arc reluct:tnt to "~o fot the j ugular", they n1ay need cncourageo1e..11t. It is 
sometime.o; suggested th~t11>s>•ehology needs :l Nobel prize. bul I think 1hat \vould be a 
mi.slake. I propose an il\\'ilrd "to 1he rescarc.hcr 'vho has most advanced psychological 
science by admiuing error." (It wouldn't h~1ve 10 be given every year.) 
As 11tis diSClL~Sion of confirmation bias sugge..,.1s, fonn1tl modeling has limitalions. 
i•S well as streng1hs. Explanalory models forn1alizc the deductive. process. but 1h~11 is only 
one crucial par1 or the scien1i fie enterprise. Theorists n1us1 be clear and Ct)n .. <;i$tCnl in their 
assumption..;, but beyond !hat 1hey can make any postulates the)' '"illll. '('hey can change 
1hcir postulates if 1hey don't like ho'v they bchave··indecd, 1he "hypothetico.dcductive 
method" dict(1te-s !hat this is hO\\' things arc. done. A thcoris1s can even reinterpret 1hc \Vay 
the 111odel rcl••lcs to the \vorld, v.·hile leaving the model iLo;;clf exactly 1hesa111e. ·r11e 
invenlion. intcrprctati<)ll, and evaluation of a n1odcl are n1atters co111ple1e.ly ou1side !he 
formal sys1cm itself. A-s such, they arc subjec1 to all the ' vcaknesses or hu1na11 rcas-ooing 
discussed earlier, as v.·ell tis to its strengths. 
Evaluating 1\.1odels 
The problen1 of n1odel evaluation raises 1hc qucs1ion of \Vhich predictions arc fair 
gan1c . A scientific model of any cotnplex dt>main mus1 include some assumptions 1h:u arc-
arbi1rary hul necessary 10 get !he n1odeling e.xercisc. off the gn)und. For example. 
nlalhe1na1ical 1n1)delcrs oflcn assun1e linear or exponential funeti<)nS, solely bcc~ilL'>C they 
arc n1a1hen1atically trac111ble; and simulation n1odelcrs cn1ploy discrete 1in1c steps because 
1hat is ho\v cornpu1ers \vork. In n1y l'vflNERVA 2 model, stimulus items and memory 
ttaces are represented as randon1 vecto~ of+ J's, ·l's, ;"tnd O's. S\1ch assumptions are not 
the focus of intcrcs1. They are adopted for their fami liarity. tractability. and case of 
implemcntalion. and because. you ha,•c to be explicit about cvery1hing 10 have a sys1en1 !hat 
v.·orks. No\v an in1pot1a11t question is, if you :ire going to "go for 1hc jugular," do you 
fflClL'> <.in " prcdic1ion that crucially depend.':' on these <1rbi11.1ry assumptions, n1thcr th:1n on 
what lhe lh<.'Orisl considers the central one.'>'? I see tCSL':' of thc. lisJ·Strcng1h effec1, predicted 
hy 1ny model and others, as i1n1)()rtan1 {R11tcli ff. Clark & Shiffrin, 1990): but i f someone 
...,·ere 10 shov.· empirically that stin1uli cann(1t be· random V<."<.:lors, I \vouldn't be. espccially 
impressed. The qucstio11 of '''hich prcdic1ic.lru; 10 1cs1 c:1n be difficult 10 <1ns,vcr, hoY.•cvcr, 
bcc:n1.5c lhc li~c bet,veen foca~ and :trbi1.r:1ry assump1i.ons is full)'. .and i1 is often unclear to 
\vh:tt cx1c.n1 d1ffcrcn1 assunlpllons con1r1hutc.1u a particular prcchc11on th:u :1 mode.I make~. 
Thcexplicil rcoog1itil)n th:tt pSychological models con1ain assumptions 1h:1t <1rc 
arhitrary h;i.s son1c in1plica1ions that have been l<irgcly overlooked. One 1s tha1 assessin~ a 
model's ••bility 10 accounl for prec.isc, qu11n1i1;11ive fca1urcs of the da1a m<iy oflen be di fficult 
t<l jlL.;ti fy. I 1hink quantitalivc da1a fitting has :1 lcgi1im:uc place in lhc modeling enterprise· · 
particularly v.·hcn the core assu1np1ions of a m(xicl lcad to dcfinilc t1uan1itativc predictions. 
independently 1lf lhc :1rbitrary ones. But data filling Mlmt:limcs appear.> I<) be carried <)ul 
almost as a r itual, ( lf i1s an end in itself. J have read s1aten1e.nL~ like this: "Ahhoug_h the 
goodnCS.\.c1f-fi1 S1ati.slic u.-as signir.c1n1 (p<.01). we are genc:rallv q_uik:. pl~ .. ·ith 1he-
modcrs accoun1 of the data.'" Such remarks could be taken as nl3n1fcs1a1iOM of 
conrirma1k>n bias, hut I think they arc mocc an admission 1bal "''Clack lhc kind of precision 
lh«I the da1a-fttting exercise implicilly 3Sisumcs.. 
The obscn«llion 1hal scientific models oversimplify their domains is especially 1rue 
in psychology. Jn vinually evCI)' cxpcrhticruaJ s itua1ion, I here arc :,iHniflc11nt sources of 
v11rionce 1hn1 our models do nol even n111;111p1 10 capture in " rc./llistic '''ay. Thc."\C cnn 
include such obvious factors as subject 11nd hem diflCrc.nccs, a~ ' vcll ns ll\Orc subtle ones 
~uch ;is subjc~1-i1cnt interactit..1ns, procticc rind fntiguc effects, and the cvolu1ion or 
s1rulcRics during the cxpcri1ncn1al session. If these arc si"nificanl sources of variance in an 
• d ' . ~ ~xpcnntcnc. an ones ntodcl doc~ noc take chem 1010 account, the1i v.'hy \vould one cxpec.l 
lhc precise. quantil.ati'\'C prcdic1ioM of 1hc m()(Jcl lo be correct? This m:1y be :in example of 
Ilic 1n..ipproprialc imitation of physics. Physicist~ do OOljUSl ~Ole for the purpose or 
model buikiing that au c::lcxuons arc tokens or 1he same typ:··thcy t?cljcye it. Dy coo1.ras1. 
piychologislsdo ooc bclic\-e that all subjccL' or all '''OCds arc identical, ot th.it stntcgjcs 
fte'\"Cf change. I think 1ha.1 when ps)'Chol<>gi.sts d~un1 their models' failun!S to fit dal3, 
they :are implicitly ackn<J'A•lc:dg,ing 1ha1 suc6 precision v.·as not ;i realistic expectation in the 
liN't place. 1\ n1odi.:-l could easily fail to fit da13 from an cx.pcrimcnl even though iL'\ ct)rc 
ossu1np1ionS··lhose thttt arc the focus of intcrc.~l·-arc corrcc.1. Peripheral nssumptioni\, 
1nod.,; only to prort101c the ntodct's tr1tc111billly, ntay be 10 blame. 
Herc is an example of hO\\' nn nrbitrnry assu1np1ion c:in nlislcad. Experienced 
nux.lelcrs, as '''ell as nonn1odclers dabbling in stocha. . tic rC<t~oning. rou1inel)' make what I 
call the uojfor1ni1y 11s:.;un1plion. The pool of obscrvatit.)n~. con1bincd over subjecLo; and 
itc1ns, is used to compo1c a paran1ctcr cs1imn1c •• say, 1he probability of ri;eull~ J)=.5. F10111 
that poinc on, it is implicitly assun1(..'\l th;111his value applies to each sub!i.::ct and cnch item 
indivldu3lly, as though rec.au aucmpi.s \VCrc ilS uniform as lQ:S$CS of co1m. Puc differently~ 
it is assumed 1hat the: --Ys (or different subjcc:l·itcm combinations h.lvc a variance of :zero. 
for man)' derivations this ass:umption docs no harm. and it makes 1hc m211hcm:uics easy: 
but suppose a 1hoorisl wanis to dcri''C the probability of a subject rccallina a i::ivcn nan a1 
k!ast oooc in 1wo recall attempts. ~um in& 1h31 thc ancmpts are independent 'The theorist 
computes P+P-P2 = . 75, as the textbooks Jill dictate. The problcrn is Lhal 1his deriv~tion 
requires ll variance of zero. To sec this. consider !he mos1 extreme case. in which hulf the. 
subjcct·item con1bina1ions (Set A} have ]'>::() and hal f (sci B} have P= J, so P still has the 
111ean .S. bul the variance is ;25. for set A, P+P-P2 = 0, and for scl B, P+P~P2 = I, so 
the "corrcc1" predic.tit">n is .5 inslcad of .75. The m(.ldcl n1ay be rejected bccnusc the 
!lrOOictcd value of .75 is IQO high. cvcn thoui;:h all I he pos1ulatcs arc corroct except An 
unrlict 011C··lh~ uniform.ity tlSSU11lp!iC>n. Thi; Sl'1rk ~implicit}' of lhis cxa.1nplc 111f1~ mt1.kc lhc 
error seem obvious, but 11 cmps up 111 the n1cmury htcr;:Jture repeatedly 1n n1ore di.~gu1scd 
fotn)S. ~c:archcrs \vho v.·uuld never argue explicialy that alJ subjecis. ilcms. or subject · 
ilcm combinati00$ arc the same, '"1mctimcs go to great lengt~ k> perform quan1ita1ivc teslS 
th.11 depend Cfllcially on that being true.. Once the assumptions: <>fa model have been laid 
down. their initial arbitrariness 1.t:ridii: 10 be forg()(tcn----as though the acdibilhy of the model 
as a whole can bediYQll.'.X:d from the crcdib41hy of its parts. 
So a model can !iii 10 fit data c\•cn if its core assumptions Arc ri.:hc. Arc "'con 
firn1cr ground ir v.•c have a n1odcl thal fits? Consider the a_c;1onishing !JiUCC:CS~ of 1hc one· 
c:lcmcn1 n1odcl (Bo'''cr. 1961), \vhich rilled nuntcrous statistic.'> fr<ln1 " h11ndful of paircd-
;1~soch11cs expc::rimcn1s \Vith incrcJiblc precision. dCSJ)ile having only one f rec pnran1cccr •• 
1hc l)robahility of all-or.none learning of o poir on a given s1udy trial. The 111txlcl n1adc no 
ollo,vnncc for confus ions arnnng ii ems. ~111d it r1ssumcd··impl;1us ibly--tho11hc lcorning rate 
v.•as thcs.an1c acr<~s all subjects and items and trials. ~toroovcr, a \vidc rani;c of empirical 
evidence shows 1hc:lt the model's basic assunlption of all-or-none k-.arnin~ ls wrong. The 
Onc'<-femcnl model docs a good job of fitlingsimulation data from my ~i1ncrva 2 mocJcl 
( f-Jintzman, 1984), even 1hough the a~~ump1ioos <>f 1hc models diflCr in .several significant 
\VBy.s. The lcsson I dra\v frorn all lhis is tha1 a 111odcl can fit dilla \Vith in1prcssive pl'\.-clsion 
even though its basic assumptions arc "'·rong. 
So far. I have argued 1h-a1 nei1hcr failure nor success in fitting psychnlogical da1a 
quantilativcly is a rc.li:1blc guide to the 1ru1h of .i model'!> core assu1np1ions. Thi!; n1ay 
seem 10 undcrmine the ' vholc model in& cn1crpt-isc-. but it sin1ply rcaffinns thnt cvalu:ition is 
a n13ttcr of hu1n:1njudgmcnt. Ct cannot be reduced to .a slnlplc nlgocith.m. such as 
axnpu1jng (or comparin&) mcasutt.$ of goodnes.s or fiL In evaluating a model. man)' 
qU(${ions oocd 10 be asked: \Vhich ~ssun1plions dcse:F""·c 10 be t:Jken seriously. and which 
arc arbitraary? 'fo \vhat cx1ent does A JJar1icular prcdictit)n d1.:pcnd, either qu:-1ntit~11 ivcly or 
qui1li1ativcly. on assun1p1ions 0CIJ1~c ''''0 tyr)C.S'f 1\ re the oorc as.'\ump1ion.'i of the model 
pl:1usible? How to they rit 'vi1h data :ind choory ln related domain.-.·? Dc;pcnding oo the 
particular s.itU3tion, then: arc any number of questions thal one shoukl ask. \Vhy shou)d 
th~ be so complicated? ~"Y ~nswcr i1' that 1hc point of mode Ung is no1 really to ri1 dnln, 
all hough snudclcrs often seem to assume that it is. The 11uin1 Is 10 learn things. Jn a 
niodcl, Osle. has an :trtificinl sys1cn1 through 'vhich the intcrrclalionships bct\vee.n 
n..~sumptions and behavior can be expk>rcd. By comparing 1hc bcha"-ior or such systems 
with the behavior o( subjects. '11.t.t: can confinn, n::finc and revise our ~ of how mental 
~,roccs.s.c.s "''Ork.. Fiui~g dllta may.aid in. lhi~ ~c1 ivily or may even distrilcl from it, 
depending on 1he spec inc con1c.x1 111 'vh1ch 1t 1s done. 
lf O\'Crsimplifte::t1k>n can caWK! certain pmhkms.. the :alternative is "'Urse.. 
Computer modelers, in panicuJar. can sc• carried 3""3}1 wilh lhc power and nexibilily ar1he 
programn1iny: medium, :JS I hough tbC goal \VCrC 10 Create in Ille Computer U C<)mplctc 
duplicate ol' 1hc hun1an 1nind. Such 1nodcls quickly bt"COn1e SC.> un,vicldy that no one:: cnn 
tcll v.·hy they foi l or succeed. Th~ co1nplctcly misses lhe point or con.~1ruc1ing a formal 
model in the (i1s1 place. I( lhcorics evolve by shedding their b3d assumpcions and ka:png 
or adding good Ont.:$, then 1hcy must be simpJc enough to be understood. Piling ad hoc 
iL.1>sumptio11 on 1op or ad hoc assumption can only impede protrcss. by oh.<icuring \\•hot the 
oorc assuo1p1ions of the n1ode.1 in1ply. 
Because scienc:c is a collective activity, cvalu3ting models also requires good 
communication. ~odc1c:rs somc1imc complain thnt expcrin1cnters continue to dray.• 
inferences al)()ul undel'lying n1echanisn1s. l'n)m supposedly diagnostic pa11crns in 1heir data 
long u(1cr ii htis been shv\vn that such h1fercnccs arc:: \vrong (see Townsend. 1990). l\'on. 
modcJc.rs complain about v.·ading through ttchnicallydifftc:ult p<)J:>Cl'S only K)disc:m-cr. :1l"ter 
much effort. tha1 the models \l,"Cfe irrckvant 10 1hcir interests. nai .. -e_ c.•r absurd. 10c 
number of experimenters willing to read a ~ychnlocical Rcylc>y paper i.s ln\'crscly rclntcd 
10 the number <>f equations it co111ains ond ti) the strangt:ncss of lhe 1'y111bols it c1nploys. 
t\nd the nun1be.r v.·ho \viii read an article in the Jnumal or ~t:11hcn1atic:i l Psycholo2y is 
zero. Our di.~ipCinc woukl bcnefi1 i£ experimentalists pul mOfc effort into keeping up with 
dc\'Clopmcrns in modclin&. but modelers need 1u 1ake the ini1ia1i"-e, 100. They could make 
more use c.->f dia$-rams 10 get basic ideas ;tcross., and put n101'C ~rron into expk11ning in 
\Vords wht11 1hc1r ma1hcn1a1ical cxprc.'iS:ions n1ca11. If non-n1odclcrs \Vere c11llcd on to 
review modeling papers (and modclerg cxpectt"<l this). ntaoy communicatk1n difficul1ics 
might be avoided. Highly technical papers written ror a mathematical audience mighl be 
supplemented with more n:3dab4e ,.ummaries c>f 1hc ccntr.tl implication.'\ in mainsiream 
cognitive journals. In 1hc long run, our science will benefit if student~ get more cxr·>ericncc 
'" Ith forn1al rnodcls, as both produ<X:rs and consu111crs; but progress in this direc.tion ha$ 
been slow. 
Cootluding Remarks 
Broadbt!nt (1987) has e<.>mplaincd that s111ndards of preci:-.il>n in lhcol)• have nDt 
kCJll pace with tho!>e in cxpcri1ncnu1I methodology. :ind that they n1oy cvi.:n ha"c regressed: 
Tcntl.'l are used such as ·access 10 the lexicon'. 'auton1a1ic processing'. 'central 
cxccu1ivc'. 'rcsouict:ii'; formnl definitions or such 1e.rn1s tJrc rare. nnd even rarer arc 
s1a1e1ncn1s of the tulc~ supposed le) he governing their intcn1ction. 1\s n r~ull one 
is left unch:ar about c.xactly " 'hut kinds of exper imental data \\1ould involldatcsuch 
lhcorie.~. t1nd whether or not they arc intended 10 apply to soo11; 111.!\V cxpcrin1cn1al 
situation. (p. 169) 
\\'oltk.iAA ( 1990) recently struck a similar nolc: 
\Vhcn a lheOfydocs attract criticNn.1hc critic almost always 1ums ou1 lO ha\"c 
misundc"'ood. •nd the lhcc<y stands as originally proposed .... On the rare 
occasion a criticism dcn1ands 1c1ion. fine 1uning will almml always suffice. Thus. 
the chances of a theory havina 10 be abandonod or even appreciably revised ilS a 
consequence of criticis.111 are vanishingly small. and hence researchers cnn he 
confident that their thoorics will s111y alive just as long (l.') they con1inuc 10 11ourish 
lhcm. (p. 328) 
Interestingly, \vhih: th<.-sc two oulh<>rs nppcar to describe the si1n1c syn1ptoms. their 
diag~os~ arc <1ui1c diffe'7n.t. Bro~dbcnt ( 1 9~7) argues that rescatchcrs ~houtd ;1void the 
omf)1gu1ty t')f verbal theor1z1ng by 1mplc111enllng: simple models on a pctSC>nal cumpu1cr. 
But \\~tkin.~ (1990)--noting that mcxsl theories are vnguc and that n1ost thc.'Orics in,<0ke 
mediating processes ~uch <k$ mc.:mory trfiClC5)--concludes coot "the pmhk:m is 
mcdiationism'" (p. 328). 6ru;adbcnl chink$ "A'C need 10 1.ightcn up our c:cplarmlOCy lhc:orics.: 
\\lb1kins thinks \1;c nttd k) gel rid or them. 
Obviously. 1 side with Bro:tdbcn1 on this is.~uc, and not wi1b \\fatk.ins. But let u'\ 
Jook at the examples Lhal B~dbcnt and \\~tkins support lhcir ~it ions with. Bm;idbeol (t 987) dcJnons-1ro1cs 1bat a simpk computer si1nula1ion model c.1n mimic several qui1e 
different pa11erns of rcaclion times common I)• obtained in visual-search and nlC1nory-
scarch cxperimcnts·-pauerns so different 1ha1 1hcy have. been bclicvod to rc llcct quite 
dlffercn1 sor1s of underlying 1nech:1nis11is. \Va1kins ( 1990) gi,•cs his O\Vll "cue ovctlo.ad 
principle" as an exan1plcof the ~orl of cn1pirical la,vs 1h11t can be achieved \Vithou1 
postulating mediating pcoc<."SS.C$ or s101es. (0 rhis principle says that the n1orc irc111s a cue 
su1~un1e-:;. the less e tTectively it retrieves nny one of them.) To show that ntcdiflting St:Uc..'S 
arc not c:iscn1i:al co scientific explan:a1ion in general. \\.~tkins cites Nc'tA.•ton,s l.1w or 
u n ivc.rs:ll ;i Uraclioct. 
Ne"A10n. how~-e.r. used a rormal model le) provide a deep cxplana1ton o( many 
phcnonie:na th:a1. on the surface. :appear qui1c di"'CtSC. As Rcic:.hcnbach ( 195 I) comments: 
The la""' e,_)f gravitation hai. thc form of a ra1her simple ma1hc:ma1ical cqua1ion. 
Logically speaking. ii co1ii.1i1utes •1n hypothesis, v.·hich is not acccssihlc 10 direct 
vcrilica1ion. It is established indir(:c1ly, since, as Ne\vlon showed. nll 1hc 
observational results su1nm~rlzcd In KCJ>lcr's l:t\VS can be derived l'ronl It. 1\nd 11ot 
only Kepler's results; from Nc\VIO•l's la\\'. Galileo's la\v of falling bodies is 
likc\visc derivable, and so ' 're 11111ny other oh$c.rv:uional fac ts. such as the 
phenomenon of 1hc tides in their correlation to the pu$itiuns <lf 1hc moon. (p. I 01) 
f_ater, Reichenbach llircc1ly contrasts the basic n1l1lrO:ich advoca1cd hy \Vatk.in.s (of1cn called 
functionalism in psychology) with Nc\vton's mt.:thod: 
\V'l\oewr spc:1ks or cmpiric:al science shc>ukl not rOl'~l lhat observation and 
e.xpcrimen1 have been capable of building up moderD sctcncconl)• bc..-causc 1hcy 
were combined \\•ith 1nathcmatical deduct inn. Ncv.·ton"s physics differs grca1ly 
fro111 lhC piCl\ITC Of inductive SCiCOCC thill hnd been drafted (\VU gcncratiOllS Cl\tJiCr 
by f'roncis Ba<.."011. J\ 1ncrc.collcc1ion of ohscrv:uional races, suc.h <L'i prcl)Clllcd in 
Bacon's 1ablc.s, would ncvt::r have led~' scientist k.l the discovery of the Iii.\\' elf 
auracllon. ~ta1hcma1ical deduction in con1bin:a1ion voi1h otlscrva1ion is lhc. 
i.nsarumcnt that ac.xiounts for the succcs:s of modem science. (p. I 03) 
Certainly, Droadbcnl's modeling exercise: fies Newton's hypothc1 ico·dcduc1ivc n1c1hud 
bc11er 1h:1n \Va1kins's cmpiric:tlly induced cue-ovcrlood principJ.,; docs. 
It i:s front thi.'> pcr.;pcc1ivc •• t11a1 ..... c should seek deep cxplannt ions of the la\vf ul 
phenomena we obseri•t:··lh:tl l am e.na:>~~cd by the current crop or mcmo_r)' _model'> (e.g.. E;ch, 1982: Gillund & Shlffrin, l'IM; Hinczmon, 1986; llinlZl!l3n, 1988: 
Humphre),., el al.. 1989; :\furdock, 1982: Munlock. 1989: Raaijmnken< & Shilfrin. 1980). 
Ra1hcr than (<1C1JSing 01 spi.:eilic 1asks. in 1hcstyl1,;nf 1hc maLhcJnatical psychu1ugy of 1hc 
t960's, such n1odels as t\·turdocl:.'s TODAt\1 0 11cn1p1 10 chan1t:1crizc lhc basic properties of 
a n1c.mor)' sys1c n1 that under lies ~x:rf onnancc in nt Oll)' tasks. A hh<n•gh ex isling efforts are 
only apprQxintations to the idcnl. the genc-ral approach can be ch:iractcrizcd as one of 
postulatin1' a kind of memurk1l dccp-sttucturi: whose p rinciples :are manifested in v:.rious 
ways when the system is pbccd in diffcrcot ta.1k ~nvrronmcnts. 1'hc focus of int\!n.:st is on 
undctsL1nding how many app;1rcntly diYetSC empirical pOCnomcna can arise from a small 
set <.1f basic principtcz. As for the cue-c, .. ·erload principle, the current models all suggest 
1ha1 it may be just one of scvcrol impl ications of the fact that hu11111n mcmorv is con1cn1-
addrcssablc. Through the use of formal ntodcls, such C(>njcclurcs can be given rigorous 
ICSl. 
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